Approved For Release 2001 3705 CIA-RDP82-00457R005400580003-0 **CLASSIFICATION** CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO. INFORMATION REPORT CD NO. 25X1A China/USSR COUNTRY DATE DISTR. 31 Jul. 1950 Communist Military Plans and Views SUBJECT NO. OF PAGES 2 on Action in Far East 25X1A PLACE NO. OF ENCLS. Keium to CIA Library **ACQUIRED** DATE OF SUPPLEMENT TO 5X1X 25X1C INFO. REPORT NO.

Chinese and Soviet Troops, Manchuria

- In January 1950, 50,000 troops of the Chinese Communist 4 Field Army moved secretly to Manchuria. In April a cavalry division moved openly to Manchuria. The forces were deployed along the railroad from Harbin to Mukden to Changechun.
- .2. In late June and early July these troops moved into position along the Yalu River, and Soviet troops deployed into the positions the Chinese troops vacated along the railroad. This is the first time that Soviet troops have been seen in Manchuria since the war.
- 3. North Korean forces include Chinese troops and Koreans who were formerly with LIN Piao. Then the North Koreans begin to lose, LIN's forces on the Yalu will move openly into Korea to aid the North Koreans.

Communist View of Taiwan Invasion

4. Communist preparations for an all-out invasion of Taiwan were virtually completed when the Korean war began. The Communists were astounded and confused when the Seventh Fleet was instructed to defend Taiwan. The Communists intend to move against Taiwan very soon, in a probing move with limited forces designed to test U.S. reaction. They are aware of the difficulty of invading Taiwan, and if the United States actually fights the invading Communist forces, the Communists will then call on the USSR for assistance. The Communists view Taiwan as a vital political problem they must solve, while the Soviets view Taiwan as a military asset which must be taken away from the United States.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET DISTRIBUTION

Representation Secretary Date: 2

Auth.: His sale By: 3

ARMY X AR X F81

This document is hereby regraded to CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the letter of 16 October 1978 from the Director of Central Intelligence to the

STATE

Approved For Release 2001/03/05 : CIA-RDP82-00457R005400580003-0

Next Review Date: 2008

- 2 -

25X1A

Soviet and Chinese Communist Intentions toward Southeast Asia

5. The Soviets and Chinese Communists intend to probe various spots in Asia in the next three months to: (a) Test U.S. reaction, (b) acquire all that they can short of world war. They reason that the Korean war proves that the United States is not prepared, but that it also has the effect of accelerating U.S. preparations to a danger point within three months; therefore, they must move fast. The Soviets and Communists do not want world war, but realize that their probing moves may bring world war, and they are fully prepared to accept the consequences of their acts. They are convinced that the western powers are not unified and will not act effectively in concert. They plan to exploit all splits in the western camp and, consequently, will not attack Hong Kong and will give only secret aid to Ho Chi Minh, in the belief that this will cause the British and French to refrain from supporting the U.S. defense of Taiwan and other places.

Communist Plans in event of ar

- 6. The Communists are making the following preparations in view of the likelihood of world war, with the intention of obtaining the support of the Chinese people, whom they realize are hostile toward them:
 - a. Reduction of grain levies on peasants.
 - b. Increasing pay to important strategic labor forces, such as railroad workers and miners.
 - c. Intense propaganda campaign.
 - d. Increased stockpiling of foodstuffs in Lanchuria.

The Communists are also intensifying conscription and moving troops to strategic areas.

7. If world war comes, the Johnnunists will evacuate Kwangtung and Kwangsi, but will keep Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechuan at all costs, as they believe that this is the route to Joutheast Asia which they must hold.

25X1A

Corment. It is believed that this is an extremely important and reliable report, and that it accurately reflects Communist intentions and reasoning in the present situation, even though their reasoning appears illogical and difficult to understand in many cases.

COMFIDENTIAL